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TOWARD A COORDINATED JUDICIAL VIEW OF THE
ACCURACY OF BREATH TESTING DEVICES

DONALD

H.

NICHOLS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have used three primary methods to insure the
accuracy of breath testing devices.' They have examined these
methods independently. This Article, however, advocates judicial
examination of these methods in coordination with each other.
*J. D., University of Minnesota; Editor-in-Chief of the Drinking/DrivingLaw Letter, author of the
books DrinkingDriverin Minnesota and Driving While Intoxicated.
1. See, e.1z., Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256, 258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(prosecution must make reasonable efforts to preserve breath sample or to allow defendant to verify
breath test results); People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 654, 527 P.2d 361, 371, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 19
(1974) (State must save test ampoules); State v. Fuchs, 219 N.W.2d 842, 847 (N.D. 1976) (State
must comply with the statutory foundation requirements for the admission of breath alcohol test
results).
Understanding the operation of a breathalyzer is essential to evaluating the courts' approaches
in determining the admissibility of test results. The Washington Court of Appeals has succinctly
described the operation ofa breathalyzer as follows:
The breathalyzer is a machine designed to measure the amount of alcohol in the
alveolar breath and is based upon the principle that the ratio between the amount of
alcohol in the blood and the amount in the alveolar breath from the lungs is a constant
2100 to 1. In other words, the machine analyzes a sample of breath to determine the
alcoholic content ofthe blood....
To operate the machine, the subject blows into the machine through a
mouthpiece until he has emptied his lungs in one breath. The machine is so designed
that it traps only the last 52%2 cubic centimeters of air that has been blown into it. This
air is then forced, by weight of a piston, through a test ampoule containing a solution
of sulphuric acid and potassium dichromate. This test solution has a yellow hue to it.
As the breath sample bubbles through the test solution, the sulphuric acid extracts the
alcohol, if any, therefrom, and the potassium dichromate then changes the alcohol to
acetic acid, thereby causing the solution to lose some of its original yellow color. The
greater the alcoholic content of the breath sample, the greater will be the loss of color
of the test solution. By causing a light to pass through the test ampoule and through a
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One method of establishing the accuracy of breath alcohol tests
2
requires the state to lay a foundation for admitting the test results.
The purpose of laying an adequate foundation is to demonstrate
that the tests have been conducted in a reliable and scientific
manner.3 The second method of insuring accuracy allows the
defendant to discover the circumstances, the chemicals used, and
other relevant factors surrounding the test. 4 The third method
requires a second test. 5 One of the important purposes of the
6
second test is to insure the accuracy of the first test.
Courts should examine and coordinate these three methods.
For example, if a court required a very stringent foundation, then
perhaps it would not need to employ the second and third methods.
On the other hand, if a court only required a cursory foundation,
then it should seek the accuracy afforded by the second and third
methods. An examination of these approaches reveals the strengths
and weaknesses of each approach.
II. FOUNDATION APPROACH
A.

RECENT APPROACHES TO FOUNDATION

The state may establish the accuracy of breath testing devices
by laying a proper foundation. 7 Generally, the state must establish
that the breath testing device was operated according to the
manufacturer's recommendations and according to the rules and
standard ampoule con aining the same chemical solution as the test ampo-uebut
through which no breath sample has passed), the amount of the change in color can be
measured by photoelectric cells which are connected to a galvanometer. By balancing
the galvanometer, a reading can be obtained from a gauge which has been calibrated
in terms of the percentage of alcohol in the blood.
State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846,-, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (Ct. App. 1960).
2. See, e.g., State v. Ghylin, 248 N.W.2d 825, 830-31 (N.D. 1976) (breath alcohol test results
were admissible because the State laid a proper foundation).
3. See, e.g., State v. Goetz, 374 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (La. 1981). In Goetz the Louisiana Supreme
Court demanded that the State prove the reliability of the testing procedure because "an intoxication
test conducted with chemicals of inferior quality could bring to bear a practically conclusive
presumption of guilt against an innocent person." Id.
4. See, e.g., State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 33, 295 N.W.2d 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1980) ("analysis
of used test ampoule would either corroborate or refute the original test results).
5. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256, 258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(prosecution must make reasonable efforts to preserve breath sample or to allow defendant to verify
breath test results).
6. Id. at 259.
7. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 852, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 (Ct. App. 1960). The
Washington Court of Appeals in Baker described the foundation requirements as follows:
[Flour basic requirements must be shown by the state before the results of such tests
may be admitted in evidence, to wit: (1) That the machine was properly checked and
in proper working order at the time of conducting the test; (2) that the chemicals
employed were of the correct kind and compounded in the proper proportions; (3) that
the subject had nothing in his mouth at the time of the test and that he had taken no
food or drink within fifteen minutes prior to taking the test; (4) that the test be given by
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regulations promulgated by the authorities within the state. 8 The
authority may be the department of health 9 or similar agencies. 10
This approach assumes that the manufacturer and the authorities
responsible for promulgating rules and regulations are sufficiently
qualified to insure the accuracy of the test.1 1
When examining a foundation, courts, however, are
confronted with the practical problems of requiring a foundation
that demonstrates more than the simple operational requirements
of a testing device. 12 Typically, the state requires that operators of
testing devices receive training.' 3 Operators usually only
understand the operation of the device and not the underlying
theories of the device. 1 4 An understanding of the underlying
theories frequently requires a broad knowledge of toxicology,
a qualified operator and in the proper manner.
Id. See generally Case Comment, State v. Gerber - FoundationRequirementsfor Breathalyzer Test Results, 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 334, 338-40 (1980) (establishing the accuracy of testing is essential for a fair
trial).
8. See, e.g., State v. Gerber, 206 Neb. 75, 87-88, 291 N.W.2d 403, 410 (1980). The Supreme
Court of Nebraska insured accuracy by requiring the State to prove four facts: at the time of the
arrest the machine was working properly; the operator was qualified and possessed the statutorily
required permit; the operator complied with the testing requirements of the Nebraska Department of
Health; and the operator met other statutory requirements. Id. at 90-91, 291 N.W.2d at 411-12.
9. Estes v. State, 358 So. 2d 1050, 1056 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (State Board of Health
approved both the breathalyzer test and its operator).
10. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(5)(c) (1980). This section provides for the
admissibility of chemical analyses of blood, breath, saliva, or urine when the State demonstrates that
the tests complied with the methods or devices approved by the state toxicologist. Id. Section 39-2007(5) states in part:
The results of... chemical analysis shall be received in evidence when it is shown that
the test was fairly administered, provided that a test of a person's blood, urine, breath,
or other bodily substance and the result thereof is further shown to have been
perlormed according to methods or with devices approved by the state toxicologist, or
both, and by an individual possessing a certificate of qualification to administer the
test issued by the state toxicologist .... Upon approval of the methods or devices, or
both, and techniques required to perform such tests and the persons qualified to
administer them, the state toxicologist shall prepare and file written record of such
approval with the clerk of the district court in each county within the state which shall
include:
C. Trhe operational check list and forms prescribing the methods and techniques
currently approved by the state toxicologist ....
1, 1983)).
Id. (amended by S. 2372, 48th Leg., - N.D. Sess. Laws_-(effectiveJuly
11. See generally Bass, Gesser & Mount, Notes and Comments: Scientific StatisticalMethodology and the
Doctrineof "Reasonable Doubt" in CriminalLaw, 5 DALHOUsiE L. J. 350, 362 (1979) (With respect to the
use of breathalyzers, "there is the distinct possibility that judges and lawyers have committed the
very simple error of confusing probabilities with possibilities. ").
12. See generally Comment, Breath Alcohol Analysis: Can It WithstandModern Scientific Scrutiny?, 5 N.
Ky. L. REV. 207, 216 (1978). The author questions the reliability of the breath samples taken by
police officers in police stations. Id. If officers fail to meet the simple operational requirements, then a
more stringent foundation would be necessary.
397 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1979)
13. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Kepley, 60 Ohio St. 2d 73, -,
(Even though the Director of Health "promulgates a rule that a Breathalyzer test administered by
one holding an operator's permit is to be performed under the general direction of a senior operator,
the senior operator is not required to be physically present when the operator administers the test.").
14. See State v. Entze, 272 N.W.2d 292, 294-95 (N.D. 1978) (operator conceded that he did not
know much about the breathalyzer except how to operate it). See also State v. Jones, 316 So. 2d 100.
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pharmacology, chemistry, electronics, physiology, and other areas
of science and medicine, 15 while the training of the operators
normally is completed in a relatively short period of time. 16 Thus,
operators generally can only testify that the device was operated in
accordance with a checklist promulgated by the manufacturer in
conjunction with the local governmental agency responsible for
17
testing within the state.
If courts required expert testimony in addition to evidence of
the proper operation of the device, they would confront the
practical problems associated with requiring an expert in every
case. 18 Recent decisions have been reluctant to require testimony
beyond the mere operation of the breath testing device. 19
Requiring an expert would entail either additional extensive
training of the operator or the presence of an expert at the trial.
Expert testimony would increase the costs of litigation, perhaps
substantially. A recent case that typifies judicial response to this
problem is State v. Powell.20 In Powell the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that breath test results were properly admitted even without
testimony from the officer or an expert witness that the machine
was operating properly. 2 1 The peace officer was not allowed to
testify that the machine was operating properly. 22 He was,
however, over the objection of defense counsel, allowed to testify
that there were no physical indications of malfunction of the
101-02 (La. 1975). In Jones the Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized that the best evidence of the
operator's qualifications was the machine operator's permit, not the operator's testimony, because
the impermanent character of the permit signifies a need for new knowledge about testing
procedures. Id.
15. See, e.g., Watts, Some Observations on Police-AdministeredTests for Intoxication, 45 N.C.L. REv.
34, 80-81 (1966). The relatively inexperienced breathalyzer operator cannot usually testify about the
numerous scientific theories related to the proper functioning of a breathalyzer. Id. For example, the
operator could not explain Charles Law's formula on the expansion of gases, the fact that a reagent
oxidizes a breath sample when the breath enters the ampoule, and the relationship of Beer-Lambert
Law and the inverse-square law to the principles of the photoelectric system. See id. See generally
Mason & Dubowski, Breath-Alcohol Analysis: Uses, Methods and Some Forensic Problems - Review and
Opinion, 21 J. FORENSIC SCI. 9, 30 (1976). Scientists Mason and Dubowski state that law enforcement
personnel need scientific competency if regulations require the use of instruments accepted by the
scientific community. Id.
16. See State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, __,
199 A.2d 809, 823 (1964) (police officer had
completed a forty hour course for drunkometer operators).
17. See, e.g., State v. Entze, 272 N.W.2d 292, 294 (N.D. 1978) (certified operator testified that
he operated the breathalyzer according to a checklist and that he did not know the principles
underlying the operation of the machine).
18. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 15, at 78. Watts notes that courts are accustomed to having
experts testify and have "come to expect them in every case." Id. He adds, however, that scientific
methods can remove the requirement of a scientist's expert testimony. Id. at 82-83. The legislature
may presume the validity of the breath tests, the court may take judicial notice of reliability, and the
state may prove at trial that correct operation of the machine by a trained operator signifies scientific
validity. Id.
19. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 618 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (defendant unsuccessfully
argued that the trooper who administered the test had testified only to his opinion regarding the
proper functioning of the machine).
20. 618 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
21. State v. Powell, 618 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
22. Id. at 48.

1983]

BREATH TESTING DEVICES

333

breathalyzer. 23 The court reasoned that even without the testimony
of the officer the breathalyzer test results would have been
24
admissible.
Some courts have taken a further step, allowing the state to
introduce the results of the breath testing device even though there
were certain defects in the testing procedure. 25 In State Department of
Public Safety v. Habish 26 the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained a
license revocation under circumstances that indicated that the
simulator solution was potentially defective. 27 The simulator
solution is a known solution that is tested by the breath testing
device to verify the device's accuracy. 28 At trial it was established
that the operator had complied with the breathalyzer checklist by
conducting a simulator test following the defendant's test. 29 It was
also established that the simulator solution generally was changed
30
every thirty days because of its tendency to deteriorate over time.
Despite evidence that the simulator solution used in the test was
more than two months old, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
that sufficient foundation had been laid because the simulator
solution test results were within the expected range. 31 Similar cases
32
exist in other jurisdictions.
One recent case, however, tends to indicate that the
foundation requirement is not dead. In State v. Krause33 the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 49.
25. See State v. Puhr, 316 N.W.2d 75, 77-78 (N.D. 1982). In Puhrthe North Dakota Supreme
Court stated that the trial court erred in admitting the breathalyzer test results because the State did
not comply with the methods approved by the state toxicologist. Id. at 77. The State failed to prove
that the defendant did not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke within 20 minutes before the test.
Id. The court found, however, that the expert testimony of the state toxicologist cured the
foundational defect. Id. at 77-78. The toxicologist testified that a test conducted 10 to 12 minutes
after the defendant had something to eat, drink, or smoke would nonetheless be valid. Id. at 78.
In addition, the court implied that neither expert testimony nor a proper foundation is required
to affirm a finding that a defendant is guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. Id. at 77-78. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1980) (a blood alcohol reading of
0.10% gives rise to the presumption of legal intoxication). Section 39-20-07 has been amended to
provide that a blood alcohol reading of 0.10% is legal intoxication rather than a presumption of
intoxication. S. 2373, 48th Leg., N.D. Sess. Laws (effective July 1, 1983). The court
maintained that the arresting officers' testimony about the defendant's inability to pass field sobriety
tests constituted evidence that raised a question of fact for the jury. 316 N.W.2d at 78. The court,
therefore, held that the officers' testimony properly defeated the defendant's motion for an acquittal.
Id. at 79.
26. 313 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1981).
27. State Dep't ofPub. Safety v. Habisch, 313 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 1981).
28. See id. at 14.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id. at 16.
32. See, e.g., State v. Liuafi, 623 P.2d 1271 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981); State v. Luckey, 304 N.C.
App. 731, 282 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1981). In Liuafi the Hawaii Court of Appeals stated that the
police officer's testimony that the simulator test he performed revealed the expected reading
established prima facie the proper operation of the breathalyzer and the use of the correct chemicals.
623 P.2d at 1279-80. Similarly, in Luckey the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the State was
not required to introduce expert testimony concerning the breathalyzer test. 304 N.C. App. at..,
282 S.E.2d at 491.
33. 405 So. 2d 832 (La. 1981).
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Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that the State could not avail
itself of the statutory presumption of a defendant's intoxication
arising from a chemical analysis of his blood through a PhotoElectric Intoximeter (PEI) 34 unless it has properly established the
ground work for the presumed reliability of the test result. 35 To do
this the State must fulfill two requirements. First, the State must
demonstrate that it has officially promulgated detailed methods,
procedures, and techniques that insure the integrity and reliability
of chemical tests, including the quality of the chemicals used. 36 The
State must also prove that it has strictly complied with the officially
promulgated methods, procedures, and techniques in the chemical
analysis offered as evidence at trial.3 7 The court cited its earlier
decision in State v. Goetz38 for the following proposition:
"Because an intoxication test conducted with chemicals
of inferior quality could bring to bear a practically
conclusive presumption of guilt against an innocent
person, it is essential that the officially promulgated
methods, procedures and techniques include a thorough
analysis of the chemicals by a chemist under laboratory
conditions to insure that they are of proper composition, strength and volume at the time a test is conducted. .... , 39
Under the rules then promulgated, the Louisiana Department
of Public Safety had adopted certain regulations that required a
maintenance check of all PEI machines at least once every four
months accompanied by a spot check of the lot of ampoules used
40
with each machine.
In recognizing the purpose of the regulations, the court
reasoned that the particular circumstances under which this test
was taken did not sufficiently meet the requirements to give rise to
the statutory presumption. 4 1 The court did not agree with the trial
34. A Photo-Electric Intoximeter (PEI) "is a semi-automatic console breath analyzer that, like
the Breathalyzer, captures a measured quantity of alveolar air and determines the amount of alcohol
in the breath sample by a photo-electric comparison technique utilizing ampoules of potassium
dichromate in sulfuric acid." Watts, supra note 15, at 69. The advantage of using a PEI is that the
machine automatically retains an additional sample for a chemist's use in examining the instrument
or its opertion. Id.
35. State %.Krause, 405 So. 2d 832, 834-35 (La. 1981).
36. Id. at 834.
37. Id.
38. 374 So. 2d 1219 (La. 1979).
39. 405 So. 2d at 834 (quoting State v. Goetz, 374 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (La. 1979)).
40. 405 So. 2d at 834.
41. Id. at 835.
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court's ruling that a manufacturer's certificate prima facie
establishes the required chemical quality. 42 The court therefore
43
found that the trial court erred in admitting the PEI results.
B.

PROBLEMS WITH THE FOUNDATION APPROACH

Recent decisions tend to indicate that courts presume that if
the operator conformed to testing procedures, the testing device
operated properly. 44 The option for the defense at that point is to
hire its own expert. The defense, however, may not have the
resources to hire an expert witness to challenge the accuracy of the
breath testing device. The State's only requirement, therefore,
seems to be that it establish a prima facie case. On the other hand,
requiring the State to produce expert testimony probably would
have
substantial
economic
consequences.
Furthermore,
establishing an adequate foundation through expert testimony
might not even insure accuracy because each breath testing device
has an error factor. 45
The error factor was considered recently as it related to a
Breathalyzer Model 1000.46 The treatment of the error factor also
has been discussed in several recent cases. 47 For example, in State v.
Boehmer4 8 the Hawaii Court of Appeals recognized in a consolidated
action that the breathalyzer tests had an error factor of 0.0165% .49
At defendant Gogo's trial, the defense counsel and the prosecutor
stipulated that the error factor was exactly 0.0165 %; at defendant
Boehmer's trial a criminalist with the Honolulu Police Department
testified that the margin of error was also 0.0165%.50 The
breathalyzer test results were 0.11% and 0.10% for defendants
5
Boehmer and Gogo, respectively. '
In both cases the trial courts ruled that even with the stipulated
error factor, the readings were sufficient to give rise to the
presumption that the defendant was driving while under the
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., State v. Entze, 272 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1978) (for test results to be admissible, the
State must show that the operator possessed a certificate qualifying him to administer the test).
45. See, e.g., State v. Boehmer, 613 P.2d 916, 918 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (breathalyzer had an
error factor of 0.0165 %).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 64-71.
47. See, e.g., State v. Bjornsen, 201 Neb. 709, -,
271 N.W.2d 839, 840 (1978) (possible
inherent testing error of 0.005 % suggested that the State failed to prove the statutory presumption of
0.10% because the defendant's test result was 0.10%).
48. 613 P.2d 916 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980).
49. State v. Boehmer, 613 P.2d 916, 918 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980). The Hawaii Court of Appeals
consolidated on appeal the DWI cases of defendant Boehmer and defendant Gogo. Id. at 917.
50. Id. at 917.
51. Id.
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influence of an intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged
violation. 52 That presumption was based upon a statute5 3 that gives
rise to the presumption if there was a reading of 0.10 % or more5 4by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time of the test.
The Hawaii Court of Appeals rejected the trial courts' findings
and reversed the convictions. 5 5 The court recognized the heavy
burden of proof that the prosecution has in a criminal case and
determined that the prosecution failed to- establish a critical fact in
the cases before it.56 The court stated, "The margin of error of the
breathalyzer test means that on any given breathalyzer test a
defendant's actual blood alcohol content could be 0.0165 % more or
less than the reading shown by the breathalyzer test.' 7 The court
therefore perceived that the inherent margin of error could put both
defendants' actual blood alcohol levels below the statutory level
that gives rise to the presumption of legal intoxication.5 8
In conclusion, the Hawaii court cited with approval 59 the
Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bjornsen.60 In Bjornsen
the Nebraska Supreme Court reached the same decision on similar
facts. 61 The Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that for the
statutory presumption to arise, the results of such a test, when
taken together with its tolerance for error, must equal or exceed the
62
statutory level.

An additional problem with the foundation approach is that
manufacturers and governmental agencies may overlook or ignore
factors that affect the accuracy of the test results. 63 In 1981 the
Dade County Police Department in Miami, Florida, noticed that
the Breathalyzer Model 1000 gave an unusually high reading when
the testing occurred during a radio transmission. 64 The
manufacturer of the Breathalyzer Model 1000, Smith & Wesson,
52. Id. at 917-18.
53. See HAWAII REv. STAT. 5 291-5 (1976) (statutory presumption of legal intoxication arises
from a blood alcohol reading of 0.10%).
54. 613 P.2d at 918.
55. Id. at 919.
56. Id. at 918.
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 918-19 (citing State v. Bjornsen, 201 Neb. 709,-_., 271 N.W.2d 839, 840(1978), for
the proposition that test results must equal or exceed the statutory presumption plus the inherent
testing error).
60. 201 Neb. 709, 271 N.W.2d 839 (1978).
271 N.W.2d 839, 840 (1978). In Bjornsen the
61. State v. Bjornsen, 201 Neb. 709, -,
defendant registered a blood alcohol content of 0.10%. Id. On cross-examination a chemist admitted
that the blood alcohol test results are accurate within 0.005 %. Id.
271 N.W.2d at 840.
62. Id. at.
63. See Lauter & Simon, Breathalyzer Deofetjeopardizes ,Many Drunk Driving Convictions. Nat'l L.J..
June 7. 1982. at 6. col. 2 (manufacturer of testing devices did not immediately disclose a known
defect).
64. Id.
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tested the Model 1000 and determined that the device was subject
65
to radio frequency interference (RFI).
The defective Breathalyzer Model 1000 acted as a receiver,
picking up signals from the transmitter and giving an erroneous
reading. 66 The manufacturer discovered the problem in September
1981, but did not notify the device's users until January 1982.67

After determining that a modification of the Model 1000 could be
made, Smith & Wesson issued a customer advisory. 68 Presumably
during the interim, many courts relied on erroneous results that
met the foundation approach requirements for the admission of
breath test results.
Even after it became aware of the problem with the Model
1000, Smith & Wesson did not test its other models. 69 Smith &
Wesson manufactures other devices, including the popular
Models 900 and 900-A, that are used throughout the United States
and in other parts of the world. 70 Subsequently it was discovered
that Models 900 and 900-A are also susceptible to RFI. 71 State
agencies also overlooked the problem and did not begin testing
until late 1982.72 A court's reliance on the manufacturer's pro-

cedures and on the rules and regulations of the states to insure the
accurary of breath testing devices is, therefore, arguably misplaced.
Relying merely on an adequate foundation for admitting test
results may not adequately protect a defendant from being
erroneously convicted. A court should therefore consider supplementing, that is coordinating, its foundation requirement with
another method. Discovery is a possible supplementary safeguard.
III. DISCOVERY APPROACH
The discovery approach affords a defendant driver access to
the chemical used, the testing device, and other factors surrounding
the test. 73 A defendant seeks to discover whether the breath testing

device performed accurately. 74 The defendant must prove four
65. Id. See also Lauter, Breathalyzer'sMaker Discloses New Problem, Nat'l L. J., Nov. a, 1982, at 5,
col. 1 (microwave ovens, citizen-band radios, and police radios can interfere with Model 900 and
900-A breathalyzers).
66. Lauter & Simon, Breathalyzer Defect Jeopardizes Many Drunk Driving Convictions, Nat'l L.J.,
June 7, 1982, at 6, col. 2.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Lauter, Breathalyzer'sMaker DisclosesNew Problem, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 5, col. 1.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (1979) (State shall provide upon request full
information about the performance of the blood alcohol test).
74. See, e.g., People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 645, 527 P.2d 361, 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12
(1974) (defendant claimed that destruction of the test ampoule deprived him of his constitutional
right to due process because he could not determine the accuracy of the breath testing device).
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elements to have his right to discovery protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.75
The basic theory of criminal discovery arises from the United
States Supreme Court case of Brady v. Maryland.76 In Brady the
Court held that prosecutorial suppression of evidence requested by
and favorable to a defendant violates due process. 77 One purpose of
discovery is to preclude the state from denying a defendant access
to favorable evidence. 78 Several courts have recently applied the
Brady discovery principles to a drinking driver's attempt to discover
79
information about testing procedures.
The decisions of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v.. Humphrey8 ° demonstrate the
difficult task of determining the scope of discovery.8 1 In State v.
Humphrey the Wisconsin Court of Appeals relied on an earlier
decision 82 that granted the defendant the right to obtain and
independently test breathalyzer ampoules. 3 In Humphrey the
defendant was charged with homicide by intoxicated use of a motor
vehicle.8 4 The defendant, approximately four months after the
administration of a breathalyzer test, made a general discovery
request seeking all exculpatory physical evidence in the possession
75. See Crothers, The ConstitutionalDimension of Discovery in DWI Cases, 59 N.D.L. REV.
(1983). Crothers states that due process should protect a defendant's right to discovery if he can
establish that he requested specific evidence; that the specific evidence is, or has been in the
prosecutor's possession; that the requested evidence is favorable; and that the evidence is material to
his guilt or punishment. Id.
76. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
77. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Court stated that such suppression
"violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, 5 1 ("No state
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
78. See, e.g., People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 649, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (State
must disclose the nature of the test and reference ampoule if there is "a reasonable possibility that
they constitute evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence").
79. See, e.g., State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 20, 295 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Ct. App. 1980) (court
suppressed test results because the State failed to preserve the breathalyzer ampoules).
80. 104 Wis. 2d 97, 310 N.W.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 107 Wis. 2d 107, 318 N.W.2d 386
(1982).
81. See, e.g., State v. Humphrey, 107 Wis. 2d 107, 116, 318 N.W.2d 386, 390 (1982) (Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in finding that "a supression motion serves as an
amendment to a discovery motion.").
82. See State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980). In Booth a breathalyzer
test indicated that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.16%. Id. at 21, 295 N.W.2d at 195. The
defendant filed a request for discovery specifically seeking the test ampoule to determine whether it
was capable of producing an accurate breathalyzer reading at the time of the test. Id. at 24, 295
N.W.2d at 197. The defendant then moved to suppress the results of the test because the ampoule
had been destroyed immediately following administration of the test. Id. at 21, 295 N.W.2d at 195.
The trial court suppressed the breathalyzer test results, and the State appealed. Id. The State
contended that routine destruction of the ampoules by law enforcement officers did not infringe upon
the defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 25, 295 N.W.2d at 197. The court of appeals held that the
ampoule constituted material evidence protected by a defendant's constitutional right to due process
of law. Id. at 24, 295 N.W.2d at 197. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. State v. Humphrey, 104 Wis. 2d 97, 102-05, 310 N.W.2d 641, 644-45 (Ct. App. 1981)
(citing State v. Booth, the court of appeals stated that due process protects a defendant's right to test
independently the ampoules), reo'd, 107 Wis. 2d 107, 318 N.W.2d 386 (1982). See State v. Booth, 98
Wis. 2d 20, 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980).
84. 104 Wis. 2d at 99, 310 N.W.2d at 642. A breathalyzer test produced a blood alcohol reading
of0.23 %. Id. at 99, 310 N.W.2d at 643.
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of the State. 85 When the State failed to produce the breathalyzer
ampoules, the defendant moved to suppress the test results,
contending that the State had failed to comply with his discovery
demand. 86 The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant
87
was convicted.
The court of appeals in Humphrey interpreted its earlier
decision in State v. Booth. 88 It held that the case should be reversed
and remanded to the trial court to determine "whether the State
can establish that the chemical composition of the ampoule has
changed over time so that 'analysis of a test ampoule made by a
defense expert would be futile and unavailing.' "89
In Booth the court of appeals, in affirming the order of the trial
court, suppressed evidence of the test results because the State
failed to produce the breathalyzer ampoules. 90 The trial court had
made findings of fact about the nature and retesting of ampoules
that supported the defendant's right to discovery. 9 1 The court of
appeals concluded that the evidence supported the trial court's
92
findings of fact.
In Humphrey the court of appeals explicitly rejected the State's
argument that Booth implicitly placed a thirty-day time limit on a
discovery request by the defense. 93 In addition, the court of appeals
85. Id. at 99-100, 310 N.W.2d at 643.
86. Id. at 99-100, 310 N.W.2d at 642-43.
87. Id. at 99,310 N.W.2d at 643.
88. 98 Wis. 2d 20,295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980).
89. 104 Wis. 2d at 100, 310 N.W.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Raduege, 100 Wis. 2d 27, 32, 301
N.W.2d 259, 261-62 (Ct. App. 1980)). The Humphrey court stated that the prosecution has a duty to
disclose to the defendant information that has been specifically requested. 104 Wis. 2d at 102, 310
N.W. 2d at 644. The Humphrey court further stated that when "no request or only a general request
for exculpatory infirmnation has been made, the state's failure to disclose information is reversible
error only when the evidence is so material that the defendant is denied a fair trial." Id. The court
concluded that a defendant seeking the ampoule used in the breathalyzer examination must make a
specific request for the test ampoule in order that the state may comply or attempt to rebut the
alleged materiality of the ampoule. Id.
90. State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 20, 295 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Ct. App. 1980).
91. Id. at 22, 295 N.W.2d at 196. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
(1) Retesting ofan ampoule cannot recreate the evidentiary breathalyzer test results.
(2) Capping a used ampoule is not technically difficult or costly.
(3) The contents of a capped ampoule can be remeasured and can be tested to
determine whether the proper chemicals were present and whether they were
present in the proper concentrations and proper volume.
(4) The requisite volume of three cubic centimeters of solution in the test ampoule is
essential to the accuracy of the breathalyzer test.
(5) It is always possible to determine whether or not there was a 0.025 percent
potassium dichromate solution in the test ampoule.
(6) It is possible that the solution in a capped used test sample would be subject to
continued chemical change with the passage of time; nevertheless, it is possible to
restandardize the breathalyzer test up to 30 days after the test.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The court ofappeals stated that it would sustain the findings of fact unless the
findings were " 'against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.' " Id. at 23, 295
N.W.2d at 196 (quoting Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457,469, 251 N.W.2d 461, 467 (1977)).
92.98 Wis. 2d at 23, 295 N.W.2d at 196.
93. 104 Wis. 2d at 100, 310 N.W.2d at 643. The court quoted from an earlier decision, stating
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rejected the State's contention that Booth should not be applied
retroactively. 94 The court of appeals favored retroactive application
to all prosecutions pending at the time the Booth decision was issued
when the defendant had timely demanded the breathalyzer results
or when the defendant at trial had raised the issue of destruction of
95
the test ampoules.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, reversed the
decision of the court of appeals. 96 The supreme court held that the
State had no duty to produce the breathalyzer test ampoule used in
the defendant's test because the defendant only made a general,
rather than a specific request for exculpatory evidence. 97 The
defendant's motion failed to request that the State produce the
ampoule. 98 The court added that Booth did not apply because in
Booth the "court of appeals emphasized that it was not 'faced with a
general or ambiguous discovery request.' "99 Because the supreme
court found Booth inapplicable, it stated that the court of appeals
erred in deciding that Booth would be retroactive. 010
Even when a defendant makes a specific request as mandated
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Humphrey, courts may defeat a
defendant's right to discovery of the test ampoule by stating that
the ampoule does not produce material information. 1 1 In State v.
Larson'0 2 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that because the
defendant failed to demonstrate that retesting the test ampoule
would produce material evidence that would reflect on the accuracy
of the breathalyzer test results, he failed to meet the materiality
that " 'there is nothing magical about Booth's implied thirty day time limit. Such an implied time
limit should not be construed to be applicable to other cases wherein different circumstances may
exist and differing expert testimony may be given.' " Id. (quoting State v. Raduege, 100 Wis. 2d 27,
32, 301 N.W.2d 259, 261-62 (Ct. App. 1980)).
94. Humphrey, 104 Wis. 2d at 103-05, 310 N.W.2d at 644-45.
95. Id. at 105, 310 N.W.2d at 645. The court reviewed three criteria to determine whether a rule
should be prospectively applied. Id. at 104, 310 N.W.2d at 645. The first criterion is the effect of the
new rule on the fact finding process. Id. If the new rule has a beneficial impact on this process, then
the court favors retroactivity. Id. The second criterion is the extent of reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards. Id. This factor generally suggests prospective application. Id. The
third criterion is the effect on the administration ofjustice. Id. In Humphrey the court stated that the
rule in Booth would have a beneficial impact on the fact finding process, supporting retroactivity. Id.
The law enforcement authorities in Humphrey, however, relied in good faith on the former rule and
this reliance would suggest prospective application. Id. at 103-04, 310 N.W.2d at 645. Concerning
the third criterion, the Humphrey court concluded that it could apply the rule in a manner that limits
the burdensome effect on the administration of justice that could result from a total retroactive
application of Booth. Id. at 105, 310 N.W.2d at 645. Thus, the court concluded that Booth should be
given retroactive application in certain circumstances. Id.
96. State v. Humphrey, 107 Wis. 2d 107, 108, 318 N.W.2d 386, 387 (1982), rev'g State v.
Humphrey, 104 Wis. 2d 97 (Ct. App. 1981).
97. 107 Wis. 2d at 116, 318 N.W.2d at 390.
98. Id. at 115, 318 N.W.2d at 390.
99. Id. (quoting State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d at 24, 295 N.W.2d at 197).
100. 107 Wis. 2dat 117, 318 N.W.2d at 391.
101. See, e.g., State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808,
-_, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978) (ampoule
retesting does not produce reliable scientific evidence).
102. 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981).
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requirement of Brady v. Maryland.10 3 The court thus declared that
the State was not required, as a matter of due process, to make the
ampoule from the breathalyzer examination available for
1
independent testing.

04

The court applied the Brady standard' 0 5 and required the
defendant to establish that independent analysis of the test ampoule
would produce material evidence.' 0 6 The Larson court concluded
that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the test ampoule, if0it7
were available, could be analyzed to produce material evidence.
The court added that the scientific community has not clearly
accepted the feasibility of analyzing used test ampoules. 10 8 The
court therefore stated that it could not take judicial notice of the
results obtained from retesting. 0 9 Because the defendant failed to
demonstrate that analysis of the test ampoule would provide
material evidence, the defendant could not meet the Brady
materiality requirement. " 10
The reasoning of the North Dakota court is contrary to a
scientific study"' that examines the problems associated with the
preservation of ampoules." 2 The study indicates that when
ampoules are placed in tightly capped dark glass bottles and
refrigerated at minus one degree centigrade within one hour of the
test, the daily rate of change in apparent blood alcohol
concentration is insignificant. 1 3 Either the forensic toxicologist
103. State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 756 (N.D. 1981). Citing Brady v. Maryland, the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the State must disclose evidence that is material and favorable to
the defendant. Id. SeeBradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
104. 313 N.W.2d at 756. In Larson a breathalyzer test produced a reading of 0.15%. Id. at 75152. After taking the test, the defendant requested the State to give him, for independent testing, both
a sample of his breath obtained by the officer who had administered the breathalyzer test and the
used test ampoule. Id. at 752. The State could not honor either request because the operator did not
save a sample of the defendant's breath and because the operator discarded the test ampoule
immediately after the test. Id. The defendant contended that the State's failure to provide him a
breath sample or the test ampoule constituted a violation of his constitutional right to due process. Id.
105. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The United States Supreme Court held "that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id.
106. Larson, 313 N.W.2d at 754.
107. Id. The court set forth the methods by which a defendant could establish materiality. Id.
The court stated that expert testimony could establish that the test ampoule could be analyzed
scientifically to produce evidence reflecting on the accuracy of the test results. Id. In Larsona forensic
toxicologist employed by the state testified that it would not be possible to analyze the test ampoule to
obtain evidence reflecting upon the accuracy of the breathalyzer test result. Id. No evidence in the
record rebutted this testimony. Id. at 755. The court concluded that the defendant failed to meet the
materiality requirement of Brady. Id. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (evidence must be material to mandate
disclosure).
108. 313 N.W.2d at 755.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 756.
111. SeeJones & Volpe. Storage PropertiesqfBreath Amnpuls, 40J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 1039, 1043-44
(1979) (retesting ofampoules can produce reliable evidence).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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employed by the state toxicologist office in Larson chose to ignore
the available scientific information or he was unaware of it.
One issue that courts and defendants have not addressed is
whether the mouthpiece should be saved. A new mouthpiece is
used for each breath test. 114 Preservation of the mouthpiece would
afford a defense expert the opportunity to determine whether a
defendant had vomit or other foreign materials in his mouth during
the test. Vomit or other foreign materials can produce unusually
high test results, which would therefore render the test invalid. 115
By saving the mouthpiece the defendant may thus be able to obtain
material evidence.
Discovery of mouthpieces and test ampoules would allow both
parties an opportunity to test the validity of the breath test results.
Discovery, however, could require the state to expend additional
funds to retain and store the various chemicals and other materials
associated with the breath test. Also, some breath tests would be
difficult to reconstruct. Thus an alternative method of supplementing the foundation requirement may be more appropriate.
A defendant could supplement the foundation requirement by
asking the state to preserve a sample of his breath or by asking for
an independent test. This second test approach would safeguard a
defendant's right to due process by allowing him to verify the
results of the first test.
IV. THE TWO TEST APPROACH
Recently, state courts have considered whether the state must
provide a second independent testing of the initial chemical
analysis' 1 6 or a second breath specimen or its functional
equivalent' 1 7 to satisfy a defendant's due process guarantees. 1 8 In
114. Telephone interview with Sergeant Clifford Phelps, certified breathalyzer operator for the
Grand Forks Police Department, Grand Forks, North Dakota (Mar. 11, 1983).
115. See, e.g., Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231, -,
594 P.2d 97, 99-100 (1979) (foreign
substance composed of hydrocarbons inside the test ampoule would produce a chemical reaction
erroneously suggesting the presence of alcohol).
116. See, e.g., State v. Cornelius,
N.H.____
, 452 A.2d 464, 465 (1982) (defendant
may choose a person to conduct an additional test).
117. See, e.g., Municipality ofAnchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256, 259 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)
(State must attempt to find a method to check the results of the breathalyzer).
118. In considering whether a state must conduct a second test or provide the defendant with a
sample for his use, courts have not generally distinguished between a defendant's right to due process
guaranteed by a state constitution or by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Shutt, 116
N.H. 495,
-, 363 A.2d 406, 408 (1976) (court stated that "[d]estruction of the [test and reference]
ampoules destroyed no evidence that could be violative of due process"). The United States
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any.person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Constitution
provides the minimum standard in determining the scope of a defendant's right to due process. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 776-77 (N.D. 1974) (under the dual system of federal and
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Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano11 9 the Alaska Court of Appeals
1 20
declared that "the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution
requires the prosecution to make reasonable efforts to preserve a
breath sample or to take other steps to allow a defendant to verify
the results of the breathalyzer test." 2 1 The Serrano court recognized
that due process mandates additional testing or investigation when
the initial test produces material evidence and when the state can
1 22
conduct a second test through reasonable cost and effort.
The Serrano court also noted that a defendant may choose to
have a second breathalyzer examination performed by a person he
selects. 1 23 The court declared that the arresting officer must
expressly inform a defendant of his right to secure an independent
test.1 24 The officer must also make a reasonable and good faith
effort to assist a defendant in finding a person qualified to perform
the independent examination.1 25 Finally, the State must show that
persons qualified to conduct the independent tests were in fact
available in the area in which the officer administered the initial
chemical analysis. 126
In reaching its decision, the Serrano court relied upon the
holding in Lauderdale v. State.1 27 In Lauderdale the Alaska Supreme
state constitutions, a statute may be constitutional under the United States Constitution and
unconstitutional under the North Dakota Constitution). See generally Brennan, State Constitutionsand
the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 489, 489-504 (1977) (numerous state constitutions
provide citizens with greater protection than does the United States Constitution).
119. 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). In Serrano the defendants filed a motion to suppress
the breathalyzer test results on the ground that the failure to preserve a breath sample at the time of
testing violated the defendants' right to confront and cross-examine the evidence against them.
Municipality ofAnchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256, 257 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). The district court
granted the suppression motion. Id. On review to the superior court, the court held that due process
does not require the preservation of breath samples. Id.
120. See ALAsKA CONsT. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just treatment in the course of
legislative and executive investigations shall not be infringed.").
121. Serrano, 649 P.2d at 258.
122. Id. at 259.
123. Id. at 258 n.5. The Serrano court limited its decision stating: "We hold only that before the
results of a breathalyzer test can be admitted evidence in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated,
due process requires that the defendant be given some opportunity to secure independent testing of
the accuracy of the breathalyzer test administered." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 258-59 (citing Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976)). In Lauderdale the
State arrested the petitioner for drunk driving. 548 P.2d at 378. After entering a plea of not guilty,
the petitioner filed a motion seeking inspection of the ampoules used in the breathalyzer test. Id. The
Alaska Supreme Court declared that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the
production of the ampoules. Id. at 379. The Lauderdalecourt also noted that the State's failure to
produce this evidence violated the defendant's right to due process. Id. at 381. This right was
apparently a right protected by the due process clause of the United States Constitution; the court
supported its holding by citing cases that stand for the proposition that the due process clause of the
Constitution protects a defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment")). The court stressed
that because the subsequent testing of the ampoules would be the only means of insuring that the
State properly conducted the initial chemical analysis, the State's failure to produce the ampoules for
the defendant's use violated the defendant's right to due process. 548 P.2d at 381.
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Court declared that the State must preserve the ampoules used in
the breathalyzer test for examination by the driver.128 The Serrano
court noted, however, that the mere preservation of existing
evidence is not sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of
the Alaska Constitution. 129 The court asserted that because the
results of the chemical analysis are extremely important to an
arrested motorist, due process requires the State to make
reasonable efforts to preserve a breath sample in cases in which it
0
intends to admit the results of the test.13
The Serrano court found persuasive the fact that the
breathalyzer procedure often yields inaccurate results. 131 The court
noted that a breath sample is subject to both operator and
mechanical error and that the ability of a defendant to cross32
examine the breathalyzer test is critical to his case. 1
Finally, the court in Serrano asserted that requiring law
enforcement officials to preserve a breath sample does not place an
undue burden on the state. 133 The Serrano court noted that
technology exists for the state to erect a system for preserving
134
breath samples at a reasonable cost with sufficient accuracy.
Because law enforcement officials have reasonably relied upon the
prior legal standard, the Serrano court concluded that its decision
5
should have only a prospective application. 13
Another state court considered whether the state's failure to
preserve an additional breath sample violated the defendants' due
process rights. 136 In State v. Cornelius137 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of defendant Cornelius and
128. Lauderdale, 548 P.2d at 381. The Lauderdalecourt asserted that a subsequent examination of
the ampoules would yield scientifically reliable data that would ultimately determine a defendant's
guilt or innocence. To deny a defendant the right to cross-examine the results of a breathalyzer test
would deny him a fair trial. Id.
129. Serrano, 649 P.2d at 259. See ALAsKA CONsT. art. I, 9 7. The Serrano court declared, "We do
not believe that Lauderdale can be restricted to merely require the state to preserve existing evidence."
649 P.2d at 259.
130. 649 P.2d at 260.
131. Id. The Serrano court noted that expert testimony revealed that the breathalyzer used by city
officials had an error factor of 10% at the 0.10% alcohol level. Id. at 259 n.8. Gas chromatography
analysis, however, has an error factor of 3%. Id. Testing the preserved breath sample on the more
accurate gas chromatograph would afford a defendant a valuable second determination of the initial
breathalyzer test result. Id.
132. Id. at 259.
133. Id.
134. Id. In reaching its decision, the Serrano court recognized that other states require the preservation of breath samples for arrested motorists. Id. at 259-60 (citing Baca v. Smith, 124 Ariz. 353,
604 P.2d 617 (1979) (State must preserve second breath sample for the private use of a defendant
upon request); Garcia v. District Court, 197 Colo. 38, 589 P.2d 924 (1979) (evidence of breath test
suppressed when State failed to preserve breath samples); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1203(a) (1981)

(State required to preserve initial breath or blood sample to allow a defendant the option of
independent analysis)).
135. 649 P.2d at 260.
136. State v. Cornelius, N.H. -_, 452 A.2d 464 (1982).
137. -_ N.H.-, 452 A.2d 464 (1982).
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remanded the motion to suppress evidence of defendantJones for a
trial on the merits. 138 The issue in Cornelius was whether the State
violated the defendants' due process rights when it failed to take
additional breath samples during the administration of the
breathalyzer tests. 3 9 Although the New Hampshire court affirmed
Cornelius' conviction, the court indicated its general approval of
40

the two test approach. 1

The Cornelius court held that the equal protection 1 4 ' and due
process clauses do not require the State to preserve an additional
1 42
breath sample for independent testing by a defendant.
DissentingJustices Batchelder and King stated that the denial of an
opportunity to have a second breath sample tested violated the
defendants' constitutional due process rights.1 43 Justices Batchelder
and King believed that a defendant has a constitutional right to a
second breath sample and that this right should apply to the
defendants in Cornelius.144 Justice Douglas concurred specially, but
stated that "a second breath sample or its functional equivalent
should be available" in cases "arising out of facts occurring on or
after February 1, 1983. ' 145 Thus, although the New Hampshire
court affirmed Cornelius' conviction, it recognized that basic
fairness may require the State to avail itself of technological
46
advancements.1
The Cornelius court relied on State v. Shutt.147 In Shutt the New
138. Id. at-__,
452 A.2d at 465. This appeal was a consolidation of two trial court decisions.
Id. at
-_, 452 A.2d at 464. In the first case Cornelius was arrested and charged with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Id. The arresting officer administered
a breathalyzer test that showed a blood alcohol content of 0.21%. Id. at -. , 452 A.2d at 464-65.
The defendant's motion to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test was denied by the trial judge,
and the defendant was subsequently convicted. Id. at-.,
452 A.2d at 465.
In the companion case Jones had been arrested for the same violation. Id. He moved before trial
to have the admission of the breathalyzer test results suppressed on the ground that the State violated
his due process rights when it did not provide him with an additional breath sample for his
independent analysis. Id.
139. Id. at__, 452 A. 2d at 465.
140. Id.
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
142. N.H. at , 452 A.2d at 465. The court stated that it was "not prepared . . . to
conclude that a statute and the procedures employed in its implementation, which passed
constitutional muster in 1976, have because of. . . technological advances become constitutionally
infirm in 1982." Id.
143. Id. at -_, 452 A.2d at 467 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). ChidfJustice King concurred in
the dissent. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at.,
452 A.2d at 466 (DouglasJ., concurring specially).
146. Id. at -. , 452 A.2d at 465.
147. Id. See State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. 495, 363 A.2d 406 (1976). Shutt was a consolidation of two
appeals from lower New Hampshire courts. Id. at-_, 363 A.2d at 407. In each case the defendant
had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Id. Both defendants claimed that
the failure of the State to preserve the ampoules used in the breathalyzer test violated their due
process rights. Id. at __,
363 A.2d at 407-08. In light of this alleged due process violation they
argued that the breathalyzer evidence must be suppressed at any subsequent trial. Id. at __
, 363
A.2d at 407.
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Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted a statute that provided that
the State must allow the defendant the opportunity to have an
additional independent test performed if he so desired. 148 Although
the Shutt court recognized the statutory right to a second test, it held
149
that the State was not obligated to perform the additional test.
The Cornelius court found that technological advances since Shutt
was decided did not make the statute and the procedures employed
under it unconstitutional, but stated "that as technological
advances occur, the use of which by law enforcement authorities
will better enable the State to make more meaningful and real the
rights guaranteed citizens under our constitutions, the dictates of
basic fairness may require that the State avail itself of such
technology." 50
The two dissenting justices argued that because of the
advances in breath testing technology since the Shutt decision, the
court should now recognize that the absence of a second breath
specimen deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to due
process.1 5 1 They advocated present and prospective application of a
second breath sample requirement. 152
Justice Douglas concurred in the result, but stated that he
would overrule Shutt prospectively.1 53 He reasoned that because the
state had relied on Shutt in enforcing highway safety laws, the state
should be given adequate time to comply with any new
requirement.154 Although preferring future implementation,
Justice Douglas apparently supported the dissenting justices' belief
that due process requires the preservation of a second breath
sample. 155
California recognized in Hasiwar v.

Sillas

56

that arresting

148. State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. at -, 363 A. 2d at 408. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262-A: 69b (1978) (State shall preserve for 30 days samples of the bodily substance tested).
149. 116 N.H. at __,
363 A.2d at 408. In the breathalyzer testing procedure glass ampoules
used in the breathalyzer are broken. Id. The defendants had not shown that any useful information
could be gleaned from preserving the broken ampoules. Id. at -,
363 A.2d at 407. In any event
the court believed that the defendants' due process rights were adequately protected because they
could have had an additional independent test performed by a person they selected. Id. at -, 363
A.2d at 408.
150. Cornelius__ N.H. at __, 452 A.2d at 465.
151. Id. at .,
452 A.2d at 467 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at-,
452 A.2d at 467-68 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices stated
that "[tlo acknowledge that there is a constitutional infirmity, but postpone its recognition until a
specified future date, is to embark upon a dangerous course ofjudicial legislation and substantially to
dilutejudicial accountability." Id. at.-, 452 A.2d at 468 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at.-, 452 A.2d at 465 (Douglas, J., concurring specially).
154. Id. at-,
452 A.2d at 465-66.
155. Id. at-., 452 A.2d at 466.
156. 118 Cal. App. 3d 295, 173 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Ct. App. 1981). In HasiwartheCalifornia Court
of Appeals declared that the State properly suspended the driver's operating license because the
arrested motorist refused the officer's request to submit to a third breathalyzer test. Hasiwar v.
Sillas, 118 Cal. App. 3d 295, 299, 173 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (Ct. App. 1981). Because the first two
samples yielded results that differed by 0.05%, the arresting officer was required by administrative
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officers should obtain two breath samples from a defendant to
comply with a state administrative regulation.15 7 Furthermore, the
Hasiwar court asserted that the officer should offer the arrested
motorist the opportunity to submit to a third breathalyzer test if the
first two samples differ from each other by more than 0.02 grams
per 100 milliliters. 15 8 In recognizing that the state should protect a
defendant from the inaccuracies of the breathalyzer process, the
Hasiwar court emphasized that "[t]he testing of the breath of a
person arrested for the driving of a motor vehicle under the
influence of intoxicating liquor upon a highway or its equivalent for
the purpose of this particular statute is not simply a game." 1 9
Because an arrested motorist's license is usually subject to
automatic revocation upon refusal of the breathalyzer test, 160 the
fair administration of justice should require the states to provide a
defendant with a second analysis to corroborate the results of the
first test. The two test method appears to be the most reliable way
of guaranteeing an accurate breathalyzer test. The implementation
of the two test system, however, could prove costly to the states in
both police time and equipment. Even though compliance with the
two test method could prove onerous, the states must realize that
although the dangers posed to the public by drunk drivers are
great, the states should not infringe upon fundamental due process
guarantees in their efforts to control these dangers.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislatures and courts as agents of society should seek an
acceptable balance in protecting citizens from the inebriated driver
and in protecting a defendant's right to due process. The value of
promoting the welfare of society is inherent to the "get tough"
attitude. There is nothing disturbing about an eagerness to make
the roads safer unless legislatures and courts fail to recognize the
basic assumption of breath tests - an individual defendant,
subjected to sanctions, was in fact legally intoxicated. Judicial
coordination of the three approaches presented in this Article is one
regulation to request that the defendant submit to a third chemical analysis. Id. at 298, 173 Cal.
Rptr. at 359. Because the officer advised the motorist that he would lose his license for six months
unless he took another test, the officer complied fully with the regulation, and the State satisfied the

defendant's due process rights. Id. at 299, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
157. Id. at 298, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 298, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The Hasiwar court also stated that the administrative
regulation requiring the taking of at least two breathalyzer samples is designed to ensure the
reliability of the testing process. Id.
160. See Fitzgerald & Hume, The Single Chemical Test for Intoxification: A Challenge to Admissibility,
66 MAss. L. REv. 23, 36 (1981).
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remedy that affords the necessary balance.
The foundation approach places the burden of proof on the
state to insure that the breath test results are admissible. The
discovery approach places the burden on the defendant to prove
that the desired information would be material and favorable to his
defense. The two test approach affords an objective measure of the
accuracy of the first test. Courts should seek to coordinate these
approaches in determining a policy to insure the accuracy of breath
testing devices.

